The demand attributes of assurance services and the role of independent accountants by Eilifsen, Aasmund et al.
The Demand Attributes of Assurance Services and the Role of  
Independent Accountants 
 
 
 
 
Aasmund Eilifsen* 
Professor 
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration 
Institute of Accounting, Auditing and Law 
Hellev. 30 
5045 Bergen  
Norway 
Fax: 47 55959320 
Email: aasmund.eilifsen@nhh.no 
 
 
W. Robert Knechel 
Ernst & Young Professor of Accounting 
Fisher School of Accounting 
University of Florida 
PO Box 117166 
Gainesville, FL  32611 
USA 
 
 
Philip Wallage 
Professor 
Faculty of Economics and Econometrics 
University of Amsterdam 
Roetersstraat 11 
The Netherlands - 1018 WB Amsterdam 
 
 
Bart van Praag 
Associate Professor 
Faculty of Economics and Econometrics 
University of Amsterdam 
Roetersstraat 11 
The Netherlands - 1018 WB Amsterdam 
 
 
*Corresponding author 
 
Acknowledgements: The authors wish to thank Anna Noteberg for her assistance with data 
collection and coding.
 
The Demand Attributes of Assurance Services and the Role of  
Independent Accountants 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Several initiatives and auditors’ professional organizations have argued that 
assurance about the quality of information, processes, or compliance encompasses 
the future market base for the accounting profession.  However, the market for 
assurance services is in its formative stage and not well understood.  Based on data 
from Dutch Executive Board members this paper reports how desirable attributes of 
service providers differ across potential providers and affect the demand for 
assurance services, specifically the attractiveness of independent accountants as 
assurance service providers.  
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The Demand Attributes of Assurance Services and the Role of Independent 
Accountants 
 
 
Introduction 
 
For the past decade, the auditing profession has been challenged to cope with 
extensive changes in the business environment.  Increased globalization, advances in 
technology, growing emphasis on risk management and internal control, failures of 
corporate governance, and myriad related political forces have combined to place 
increasing pressure on auditors and firms to provide valuable and relevant services to 
various stakeholders (Eilifsen, Knechel and Wallage, 2001).  While the usefulness of 
financial statements and related assurance has been increasingly challenged,1 the 
auditing profession itself has been confronted with an unfortunate series of perceived 
failures in corporate governance and the performance of external auditors.  
Furthermore, the market for traditional audit services has become increasingly 
saturated and viewed more and more as simply a compliance requirement, rather than 
a service that provides real economic value to stakeholders.  While one can argue 
about the accuracy of these perceptions,2 it does highlight that the profession must 
face up to the changes in the environment that affect the value of assurance services 
rendered by independent accountants. 
A seminal study in 1996 by the Special Committee on Assurance Services of 
the American Institute of CPAs (AICPA), the so-called Elliott Committee, 
expounded the arguments for expanding the nature of assurance and auditing services 
provided by independent accountants.  Since then, the growth of such services is 
clear evidence that market opportunities exist for accountants to expand the range of 
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assurance services.  Most research has focused on the supply side of the market and 
primarily surveyed the practice and expectations of public accountants as providers 
of assurance services (Brackney and Helms, 1996; Boritz and Cockburn, 1998; 
Rankin and Sharp; 2000, Dassen, Schelleman and Gloudemans-Sweelssen; 2001).  
Up to now, the majority of services delivered have been financial in nature but firms 
have offered more non-traditional assurance services on a selective basis.  One 
challenge has been to unbundle the new services from the audit, and to clearly 
understand the needs of potential clients.  Surveys indicate that accounting firms 
expect to continue to expand into non-traditional assurance services.3  The AICPA 
and the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) have each recognized this 
need and have begun to address problems and opportunities in the area of assurance 
services.  In 2000, IFAC issued an international standard on assurance engagements, 
ISAE 100 (IFAC/IAPC, 2000).  During 2001, IFAC commissioned research from an 
international consortium of academics on the determination and communication of 
levels of assurance other than high (IFAC/IAASB, 2002).  In 2003 IFAC issued a 
framework for assurance engagements and a standard on assurance engagements 
other than audits or reviews of historical financial information to replace ISAE 100 
(IFAC/IAASB, 2003a, 2003b).  IFAC’s regional organization in Europe, Fédération 
des Experts Comptables Européens (FEE), has taken initiatives to develop 
frameworks for providing assurance on environmental and sustainability reporting 
(FEE, 1999, 2002).4  The AICPA (in conjunction with the Canadian Institute) has 
gone so far as to develop practice guidance and standards for specific services 
including WebTrust, SysTrust, and ElderCare.5  
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Since the market for assurance services is in its formative stages and is 
evolving rapidly, there is limited understanding of the nature and extent of the 
demand and supply of assurance services.  It is not clear what characterizes a 
desirable assurance service provider.  For example, to what extent is the emerging 
assurance market the natural domain of independent accountants?  To what extent 
can the demand for assurance services be met by accountants applying their 
measurement and verification skills in new areas?  Are auditors able to maintain the 
expected quality of assurance services being delivered without undermining the 
credibility of the profession?  Insights into these and related questions are important 
to develop efficient assurance markets and for determining the appropriate role of the 
auditing profession in such markets.  
The purpose of this paper is to examine the attributes of service providers that 
may affect the value of assurance services.  We examine how such attributes differ 
across potential providers of assurance services and how they impact the likelihood 
that specific services will be obtained from independent accountants.  In the next 
section we discuss the nature of assurance services in more detail, as well as the 
attributes of service providers that may affect the demand for assurance services.  In 
the second section we describe our research method and expectations.  The third 
section presents the results of our survey, followed by a summary and conclusions. 
An Overview of Assurance Services 
The Nature of Assurance Services 
Assurance services are defined by the AICPA as “independent professional 
services that improve the quality of information, or its context, for decision makers”.  
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While this definition emphasizes the value of information itself, the reference to the 
context of information suggests that assurance can pertain to other dimensions of 
information than just its accuracy.  For example, assurance can address the way 
information is produced, aggregated, reported or even used.  This provides an 
extremely broad arena in which to consider the role and nature of assurance provided 
by independent accountants.  The Elliott Committee Report specifically identified a 
number of assurance service opportunities by considering the needs of customers and 
whether they are currently served by accountants.  Figure 1 illustrates the range of 
assurance services considered in the report as of 1996.  The services are classified 
based on whether an existing need is serviced by accountants and whether that need 
exists for current clients or an expanded set of clients.  Until the 1990’s, assurance 
services were generally limited to quadrant I, reflecting a traditional view of auditing.  
Quadrant II illustrates services that could be provided to existing clients while 
quadrant III illustrates services that client’s may obtain from non-accountants.  
Finally, quadrant IV, arguably the area with the most growth potential, suggests 
future services that may be made available by accountants. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Insert Table 1 about here 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
The potential demand for assurance services has also been recognized by 
IFAC, which issues standards on assurance engagements.  IFAC describes an 
assurance engagement as “an engagement in which a practitioner expresses a 
conclusion designed to enhance the degree of confidence of the intended users other 
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than the responsible party about the outcome of the evaluation or measurement of a 
subject matter that is the responsibility against criteria” (IFAC/IAASB, 2003a).  
While generally more narrow than the AICPA definition, this definition encompasses 
a very broad range of potential services and is more specific in describing the 
elements of an assurance engagement, which include the following: 
- A three party relationship (a practitioner, a responsible party, and the 
intended user) 
- A subject matter 
- Suitable criteria 
- Evidence 
- An assurance report 
 
Furthermore, IFAC suggests areas in which accountants may be able to expand 
assurance services: 
1. Information and data, e.g., forecasts and non-financial information 
including environmental and social reports. 
2. Systems and process performance, e.g., efficiency, quality, risk 
management, and ISO certification. 
3. Stakeholder behaviour, e.g., ethics and integrity of individuals, 
governance, enforcement of codes of conduct and legal compliance. 
 
While effectively defining assurance services, the various professional 
pronouncements have been less helpful in answering the questions of how to create 
demand for these services and how to convince potential clients that independent 
accountants are the logical and effective purveyors of such services.  New services 
will not be successful unless demand exists and potential fee levels justify the costs 
of providing the services.  Based on a demand-side analysis, Knechel (2001) 
identified eleven assurance services that could be provided as an increment to a 
traditional financial statement audit.  The set of service opportunities was derived 
based on the five phases of effective risk management: 
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1. Identifying risks. 
2. Responding to risks. 
3. Designing information systems to monitor risk. 
4. Measuring performance related to risks. 
5. Reacting to changes in risk conditions. 
Accountants have the potential to offer services in all of these areas but, historically, 
have focused primarily on the aspects related to external reporting of financial 
results.  Table 2 highlights how assurance services might expand beyond the 
financial statements to include assessment of business risks, evaluation of responses 
to risks, and verification of performance. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Insert Table 2 about here 
- - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
Knechel (2001) also noted that there are at least four limitations to expanding 
the market for assurance services including obtaining market permission from 
potential clients (is anyone willing to pay?), maintaining independence, developing 
necessary expertise, and complying with existing regulations.  Carcello, Messier and 
Ricchiute (1998) also considered limitations on an accountant’s ability to offer 
assurance services, focusing on potential market barriers including demand, 
litigation, communication, independence, and measurement.  In short, in order for 
accountants to be successful at introducing new assurance services, they must be able 
to meet certain market tests, often in the face of competition from other professional 
service firms. 
The Attributes of Assurance Service Providers 
Prior research has examined attributes that are important for increasing the 
quality and value of an audit.  Two previous studies used a similar survey 
methodology to have respondents rate the importance of a large number of quality 
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attributes, which were then reduced to a small set of general categories using 
statistical analysis.  In the first paper, Carcello, Hermanson and McGrath (1992) 
surveyed audit partners, financial statement preparers and sophisticated users 
concerning 40 attributes that might affect the perceived quality of an audit.  In 
general, they were able to reduce the most significant attributes to four groups: (1) 
experience with the client, (2) overall industry experience, (3) responsiveness to 
client needs, and (4) compliance with professional standards.  Attributes that were 
not considered important included costs and fees, absence of non-audit services, size 
of office, and certification of lower level staff.  A similar study was conducted by 
Warming-Rasmussen and Jensen (1998) using 30 attributes.  They were able to 
reduce the attributes to six dimensions of audit quality: (1) personal credibility, (2) 
independence, (3) openness of reporting, (4) industry expertise, (5) loyalty to 
minority shareholders, and (6) professional scepticism. 
The purpose of this paper is broader than the previous studies of audit quality, 
i.e., we examine the attributes that make a potential provider of assurance services 
attractive to a consumer of such services and assess to what extent independent 
accountants possess those attributes.  Warming-Rasmussen and Jensen (1998) noted 
that many external parties have difficulty distinguishing between attributes of a 
service and attributes of a provider.  Consequently, our first step was to interview 
representatives from various professions that are potential providers of assurance 
services (e.g., accountants, attorneys, consultants, etc.).  These individuals were 
asked to identify the attributes that they felt were the most important/appropriate for 
selecting a provider of assurance services.  These discussions resulted in a list of 26 
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attributes, many of which overlap with attributes used in prior studies and/or are 
discussed in the professional literature on assurance services.  The complete list is 
presented in Appendix A.  The 26 attributes are less inclusive than prior studies 
because we omitted attributes that were unique to an audit (e.g., loyalty to minority 
interests, firm participates in a peer review process) or deemed to be overly specific 
given the broad range of services we wish to consider (e.g., structure of the 
engagement team).   
Our next step was to reduce this list to a manageable number for a broad 
based survey by conducting a pilot test that asked respondents to rate the 26 
attributes.  From this pilot testing we were able to reduce our list to a total of seven 
attributes for further study.  These include desirable qualities for accountants that are 
identified in various professional standards (confidentiality, expertise, independence, 
objectivity, and integrity), as well as market parameters (e.g., professional reputation 
and costliness)6  
• Confidentiality: This attribute refers to the extent to which a service 
provider maintains confidentiality in the conduct and reporting of a 
service.  Accountants have a high standard of confidentiality 
embedded in their professional standards.   
 
• Expertise: This attribute refers to the extent to which a service 
provider is perceived to be an expert on the context and performance 
of the service.  Accountants may be perceived as an expert in 
accounting issues but may also be perceived as being expert in 
verification procedures.  Expansion of assurance services by 
accountants may depend more on process knowledge (verification) 
than context expertise (accounting).  
 
• Professional reputation: The overall professional reputation of a 
service provider can be expected to have an impact on the demand for 
services.  The more positive image maintained by a profession, the 
more likely that they will be looked on as an appropriate provider of 
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assurance services.  Furthermore, some professions may be more 
frequently associated with some services due to tradition and culture. 
 
• Independence: Independence is the absence of interest in the subject 
matter that may impair the service providers’ judgment.  In many 
situations, the value of assurance services may depend on the real and 
perceived independence of the provider.  To the extent that a provider 
is considered to be independent, i.e., lacking in financial, familial or 
other connections to the client, the more perceived value for the 
service.   
 
• Objectivity: The value of assurance services can be expected to 
depend on the objectivity of the service provider, i.e., whether 
conclusions are affected by personal bias.  Historically, accountants 
have been well respected for their objectivity in viewing financial 
reporting.  
 
• Integrity: Personal and professional integrity and honesty may also be 
perceived to be different across potential providers of assurance 
services and may influence the demand for assurance services.  It is 
likely that some professions are viewed as having more integrity than 
others. 
 
• Costliness: Since all professionals charge fees for their services, the 
demand for assurance services is expected to vary according to the 
level and perceived fairness of the fees associated with a service. 
 
In general, we expect that there will be a positive relationship between the 
first six attributes and the demand for assurance services; we expect a negative 
relationship for the seventh attribute.  However, it might be expected that these 
attributes would vary in significance depending on the service being considered and 
the provider of the service.  For example, confidentiality may not be equally relevant 
for an engagement to assess process effectiveness as it is for an audit of financial 
statements.  Furthermore, different potential providers of assurance services may be 
perceived as being more or less able to satisfy those attributes, e.g., for some services 
the confidentiality attributes of lawyers may be extremely important, while for other 
services the technical expertise of consultants may be more important.   
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In order to examine the seven attributes in more detail, we next identified 
different types of assurance services available from independent accountants and 
determined the set of assurance providers that might offer those services.  We 
consider three broad categories of assurance services as derived from IFAC: (1) 
assurance as to the quality of information being reported, (2) assurance as to the 
effectiveness of a process, and (3) assurance as to compliance with legal or other 
mandates within in an organization.  We identified two services within each 
category, one considered to be established and one that could be expected to become 
more common in the future.  The services addressed in this study are identified in 
Table 3.  Inclusion of the financial statement audit provides an anchor against which 
other services can be compared. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Insert Table 3 about here 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
Most of the services identified in Table 3 could be provided by professionals 
other than independent accountants, except for the audit of financial statements for 
which a legal monopoly is granted to accountants.  To determine which professional 
would be favoured for providing a service, we considered seven categories of service 
provider:7 
• Accountant: Accounting, auditing and/or tax expert. 
• Attorney or lawyer: A legal expert. 
• Engineering consultant: Scientific, engineering or design expert. 
• Management consultant: Business advisor. 
• Technology consultant: Information technology and systems expert. 
• Independent non-government organization: Nongovernmental “watch 
dog”. 
• Corporate employee: Personnel currently employed by the 
organization.  
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Our expectations are that certain professions will be more frequently associated with 
specific services.  Furthermore, we expect that the nature of the demand attributes of 
the service provider selected will vary across the services. 
The Dutch assurance market and regulation of assurance services 
 No prior examination of the supply side of the Dutch market for assurance 
services has been performed.  Based upon interviews held with representatives of the 
potential service providers, we concluded that each service provider could provide at 
least one of the six services included in the survey.  However, provision of two of the 
six services is regulated: (1) the audit of financial statements by accountants and (2) 
the ISO certification.  
 Auditing of financial statements in The Netherlands is strictly regulated.  The 
Dutch accounting profession is heavily influenced by the international professional 
developments as the Dutch economy is relatively open (Wallage, 1993).  Since the 
1980’s, Dutch accountants have to comply with auditing standards that are very 
similar to the International Standards on Auditing (ISA) of IFAC.  Furthermore, the 
Dutch code of professional conduct is conceptual and equal to IFAC’s Code of 
Ethics.  This means that the auditor should be independent of the audit client 
financially and a well as in other relationships.  The most important restriction is that 
the auditor should not do any consultancy work that will be in conflict with auditing 
of the financial statements (e.g., performing major bookkeeping assistance to the 
audit client) or take part in any decision-making for the audit client.  The big 4 firms, 
medium sized audit firms and small audit firms operate in of the Dutch audit market.  
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About 90% of the companies listed at the Amsterdam Stock Exchange are audited by 
the big 4 audit firms.   
 The ISO assurance professionals, normally engineering consultants, perform 
audits in accordance with the international ISO guidance-lines.  As opposed to the 
audit of financial statements, the ISO assurance firm, not the individual auditor, is the 
licensing entity.  In the Netherlands two of big 4 audit firms are licensed to provide 
ISO certification.  In addition, technical engineering firms and so called surveyor 
provide such assurance services.  None of the other four services are covered by legal 
or licensing requirements in the Netherlands. 
Research Method 
A survey was sent to senior accounting and financial officers in 350 
companies in the Netherlands.  Companies included in the survey were identified 
using the Research Database 2000, which provides detailed information about 
companies in the Netherlands.  The Database includes all Dutch listed companies as 
well as a great number of non-listed companies as registered at the Chamber of 
Commerce.  We selected a random sample of 350 listed and large non-listed 
companies.  The survey was conducted during 2001 and the questionnaire was 
addressed to the Financial Director of the company.  Nine surveys could not be 
delivered (wrong or old addresses).  We received 45 responses, one of which was 
omitted from the analysis because the responses were incomplete.  While this 
response rate (roughly 13.5%) might seem low, given that the surveys were 
addressed to a very senior official in each organization, we feel that the response rate 
is reasonable for this type of survey. 
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The survey consisted of a number of separate sections including questions 
related to the background of the respondent, prior experience with assurance services 
(if any), and descriptive data about the organization.  Respondents were asked to 
rank the seven general attributes of assurance service providers from 1 to 7.  They 
were then asked to select the three most important attributes for each of the seven 
potential providers of assurance services included in the study.  Finally, for each of 
the six assurance services included in the study, the respondents were asked to 
identify the three most important service provider attributes relative to the specific 
service and to select their first choice of provider for that service.  The part of the 
survey relevant to this task is included as Appendix B.  As a final question, 
participants were asked to indicate the likelihood that they would acquire each 
service from an independent accountant using a scale of 1 (high) to 5 (low).   
Results 
Overall Rankings of Service Provider Attributes 
Table 4 (column A) presents the results for the general ranking of the 
attributes of assurance service providers.  “Expertise” was the highest ranked 
attribute on average and was significantly higher than the next ranked attribute (2.90 
vs. 3.40, p<.01).  The second highest ranked attribute was “Objectivity” which was 
significantly higher than the third ranked attribute (3.40 vs. 3.71, p<.05).  The 
attributes ranked as 3 through 6 did not differ significantly in their average ranking.  
However, “Costliness” was ranked significantly lower than all other attributes (3.98 
vs. 4.31, p<.01).  These results suggest that without considering specific services or 
service providers, consumers of assurance services would first look to expertise and 
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then objectivity when selecting an assurance service provider, and would not place 
much weight on cost considerations.   
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Insert Table 4 about here 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
 
Table 4 (columns labelled B) also presents the responses to a series of 
questions concerning which attributes were most important for each potential 
provider of assurance services.  Specifically, respondents were asked to select the 
three attributes (of the total of seven) that are most important to a given profession.  
This selection was made without consideration of specific services.  For the first five 
service providers listed, “Expertise” and “Professional reputation” were two of the 
three most frequently selected attributes.  However, it is the third attribute selected 
for each provider that reveals interesting differences.  Not surprisingly, 
“Confidentiality” is considered an important attribute for attorneys and 
“Independence” is considered an important attribute for accountants.  However, for 
all three consulting related providers, “Costliness” rises to be one of the three most 
important attributes.  This suggests that the services of consultants in general may be 
perceived as more fee sensitive than those of accountants or attorneys.  The third 
important attribute for using the company’s own personnel is “Integrity”.  The results 
in Table 4 also reveal that NGOs are looked at quite differently than the other 
potential service providers, being the only category with neither expertise nor 
professional reputation in the top three attributes.   
Analysis of Service Provider Attributes Relevant to Specific Assurance Services 
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To further examine the relevance of assurance provider attributes, we asked 
the respondents to rate the provider attributes as they pertain to specific services.  
Using the six services identified in Table 3, we first asked the respondents to select 
the three attributes that would be most important in considering a preferred provider 
of each service.  We than asked the respondent to identify the service provider that 
they felt they would most likely select for the service.  The responses to these 
questions are summarized in Table 5 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Insert Table 5 about here 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
Panel A of Table 5 reports the percentage of respondents who selected each 
attribute as one of the most important for a specific service.  “Expertise” was the 
most frequently selected attribute for all six services, ranging from 66.7% in the case 
of ethics audits and rising to 97.6% in the assessments of system reliability.  
“Professional reputation” was the second most selected attribute for two services 
(ISO certification, legal compliance) while “Objectivity” was the second most 
selected attribute for three services (environmental measurement, system reliability, 
and ethics).  Only two services had a third attribute that was selected by more than 
half the respondents, “Objectivity” for ISO certification and “Integrity” for ethics 
audits.  Also of interest is that confidentiality and costliness were the least important 
considerations for many services, with both being selected less than 20% of the time 
for three services.  Independence was also selecting relatively infrequently for all 
services, only rising to 38.1% in the case of financial statement audits.  Finally, it is 
interesting to note that the financial statement audit had the most diverse set of 
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responses with all attributes being selected as important by at least 30% of the 
respondents. 
Panel B of Table 5 reports the selection of preferred service providers.  Not 
surprisingly, the selection of accountants as the best provider of financial statement 
audits was virtually unanimous (41 of 42).  Engineering consultants were selected as 
the preferred provider of services related to nonfinancial environmental performance 
measures and ISO Certification.  However, in both cases, the most frequently 
selected profession was still picked by less than half of the respondents, revealing a 
potentially diverse demand for those types of services.  ICT consultants were 
strongly favoured for assessing system reliability (28 of 42) while attorneys were 
overwhelming preferred for verifying legal compliance (36 of 42).  Finally, although 
accountants were tied for the most chosen provider of ethics audits, respondent 
preferences were widely scattered across a number of different professions.   
Analysis of Association among Attributes, Services and Service Providers Selected 
In order to analyze in more detail the relationship among specific services, 
attributes and service providers, a model was developed to identify the attributes and 
conditions that had a significant impact on the selection of an accountant as an 
assurance service provider for services other than a financial statement audit.  The 
model we developed was based on an OLS regression, for which the dependent 
variable was defined as the likelihood that an independent accountant would be 
selected to provide a specific service, measured using a 5-point Likert scale.  The 
sample was pooled across the five non-audit services.  More specifically, we 
estimated the following OLS regression model: 
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PRACCT     = b0 + b1* LNSIZE + b2* BIG5 + b3* ASISOCERT  
  + b4* ASSYSTEM + b5* ASCOMPLI + b6* ASETHICS 
  + b7* CONFID + b8* EXPERT + b9* REPUT 
  + b10* INDEP + b11* OBJECT + b12* INTEG + b13* COST 
 
where: 
Dependent Variable 
PRACCT     = 5-point Likert value indicating likelihood of engaging an 
independent accountant with 1=high and 5=low. 
 
Control Variables 
LNSIZE       = natural log of total assets. 
BIG5            = if the company’s auditor is a Big 5 firm, 0 otherwise. 
 
ASISOCERT = 1 if the service is ISO certification, 0 otherwise. 
ASSYSTEM  = 1 if the service is for assurance about system reliability, 0 
otherwise. 
ASCOMPLI    = 1 if the service is for assurance about legal compliance, 0 
otherwise. 
ASETHICS    = 1 if the service is for assurance about ethical compliance, 0 
otherwise. 
 
Service Provider Attributes 
CONFID        = Rank assigned to the attribute of “confidentiality” as an 
indication of its importance in selecting a service provider 
for a specific service (1=high, 7=low). 
EXPERT      = Rank assigned to the attribute of “expertise” as an indication 
of its importance in selecting a service provider for a specific 
service (1=high, 7=low).  
REPUT        = Rank assigned to the attribute of “professional reputation” as 
an indication of its importance in selecting a service provider 
for a specific service (1=high, 7=low). 
INDEP          = Rank assigned to the attribute of “independence” as an 
indication of its importance in selecting a service provider 
for a specific service (1=high, 7=low). 
OBJECT       = Rank assigned to the attribute of “objectivity” as an 
indication of its importance in selecting a service provider 
for a specific service (1=high, 7=low). 
INTEG        = Rank assigned to the attribute of “integrity” as an indication 
of its importance in selecting a service provider for a specific 
service (1=high, 7=low). 
COST         = Rank assigned to the attribute of “costliness as an indication 
of its importance in selecting a service provider for a specific 
service (1=high, 7=low). 
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LNSIZE and BIG5 are control variables related to the company from which 
the survey was obtained.  These were included in the model because it can be 
expected that larger companies are more likely to purchase extended assurance 
services because they have greater need for such services and more resources 
available to expend on such services.  Also, large accounting firms have a broader 
range of services to offer than small firms so it might be expected that a company is 
more likely to acquire assurance services if their auditor is a large accounting firm.  
The four variables representing specific assurance services are also considered to be 
control variables.  Some of the assurance services included in the survey may be 
broadly associated with a specific profession so inclusion of a dummy variable for 
each specific service controls for this association.  The intercept of the equation 
subsumes the examination of nonfinancial performance measures.  The other seven 
variables reflect the seven attributes of assurance providers that we are examining in 
this paper.  Each observation was assigned an importance weight ranging from 1 to 7 
based on a relative ranking of the attributes.  The most important attribute had a 
value of 1 and least important attribute had a value of 7.   
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 6.  The model has an 
adjusted R2 of .135 and an F-value of 3.516 (p<.001).  Residual analysis of the model 
shows no significant auto-correlation with a Durbin-Watson statistic of 2.345.  Tests 
for multicollinearity do not indicate any problems with the model and Eigenvalues 
remain below the threshold values for collinearity.  There are no cases with 
prediction errors outside of 3 standard deviations so we conclude that the model is 
well specified8.  
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Neither of the client-specific control variables are significant, i.e., the 
likelihood of selecting an accountant to provide assurance services is not related to 
the size of the company (LNSIZE) or whether they use a Big 5 firm as their primary 
auditor (BIG5).  Only one of the control variables reflecting specific assurance 
services is significant, ASSYSTEM.  The negative value for the coefficient indicates 
that an independent accountant is less likely to be selected to perform a system 
reliability engagement when compared to the base line service (examination of 
nonfinancial performance measures).  Given the amount of effort the profession has 
invested in IT consulting and related services, this result may come as a surprise to 
many accountants.9   
Turning now to our seven test variables for the attributes of assurance service 
providers, we see that four of the attributes have a significant relationship with the 
likelihood of selecting an independent accountant to provide a specific service.  The 
lack of significant coefficients for confidentiality, expertise and objectivity indicate 
that an accountant is no more likely to be selected to provide a service than other 
professionals when those attributes are important.  Recall from our earlier analysis 
that expertise and objectivity were considered to be critical attributes across a broad 
range of services and service providers so it is not surprising that the services of an 
accountant may not be marginally more attractive based solely on expertise or 
objectivity.  That is, all professions may be perceived as having expertise and being 
objective in general, so it would be difficult for accountants to distinguish themselves 
on those dimensions.  
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The positive coefficients for professional reputation (b9 = 0.345, p<.001) and 
integrity (b12 = 0.167, p<.028) indicate that an auditor is more likely to be selected 
when those attributes are deemed important.  This result suggests that accountants 
are perceived by the market to be different from other professions for overall 
reputation and integrity.  These attributes may provide a source of competitive 
advantage for accountants.  On the other hand, the negative coefficient for costliness 
(b13 = -0.131, p<.065) and independence (b10 = -0.191, p<.012) indicate that an 
accountant is more likely to be selected when those attributes are not important, 
suggesting a potential competitive disadvantage for accountants relative to other 
professionals.  In the case of costliness, this result implies that accountants may be 
perceived as being expensive providers of other types of services. 
The negative coefficient for the independence attribute is particularly 
surprising.  This result means that an accountant is more likely to be selected to 
provide a service when independence is not considered to be an important attribute, 
which may seem counterintuitive given the importance of independence to the 
overall profession.  Does the outcome imply that accountants are not generally 
independent?  Such an interpretation would undermine one of the basic tenants of 
auditing.  Furthermore, the result apparently contradicts the results presented in 
Table 4 where independence was selected as one of the key attributes of accountants.  
However, an alternative way to look at this outcome is that it reflects the conditional 
nature of assurance services other than audits, at least as pertaining to accountants.  
That is, accountants are only selected to provide a service when independence is not 
important because respondents may be implicitly considering the non-audit services 
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as extensions of an existing audit, in which case, it would be appropriate to use an 
accountant only when independence was not an in issue.  This interpretation would 
support the view that independence is very important to accountants, but mainly as it 
relates to the audit of financial statements. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Insert Table 6 about here 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
 
Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper, we examine the attributes of assurance service providers that 
affect the demand for assurance services.  We consider the interactions among 
service provider attributes, specific services and alternative providers in order to 
assess those attributes that are most important for the selection of accountants to 
provide assurance services other than the basic financial statement audit.  We found 
that expertise was the most important attribute of service providers in a general sense 
and that costliness was least important.  When looking at the accounting profession 
specifically, we found that professional reputation and independence were also 
considered important.  When we considered the interaction among attributes and 
services, we found that accountants were more likely to be selected to provide a 
service when professional reputation and integrity were highly important and/or 
costliness and independence were not important.  While the latter outcome is a 
surprise, we interpret the result as indicating that accountants will be selected to 
provide services only when independence is not a problem so as to not interfere with 
their perceived primary role as auditors of the financial statements. 
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This paper offers new insights into the demand for assurance services and the 
role of independent accountants as assurance service providers.  The findings help us 
to understand the potential role of the accounting profession to serve the assurance 
market.  The results indicate that the trust in accountants’ independence is crucial for 
market success.  However, factors such as business’ de facto willingness to pay for 
assurance services and, particularly in the recent climate of auditing scandals, the 
accounting profession’s willingness to expand into new services, will determine if 
the assurance market will materialize as the future platform of the accounting 
profession.   
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APPENDIX A 
Full List of Attributes Initially Considered during Pilot Testing 
 
 
Attribute 
Expertise 
Integrity 
Independence 
Reliability 
Objectivity 
Education 
Clear communicator 
Impartial 
Professional 
Consistent 
Experience 
Professional reputation 
Compliance with laws and regulations 
Efficiency 
Cost 
Confidentiality 
Correct/Accurate 
Completeness 
Quick reaction 
Critical 
Recognition 
Technical 
Internal quality standards 
Member of professional group/organisation 
Not pressured by budgets 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Extract from Survey Document Pertaining to Specific Assurance Services 
 
 
 
 
Description of Possible 
Assurance Service 
The attributes of a service provider 
are listed below.  Please mark (X) 
the three attributes that would be 
most important in deciding which 
provider of the service would be the 
best to you and your organization. 
 
Based on the attributes you have 
indicated, who would be the best 
provider of the indicated service? 
 
(Choose one) 
1) Audit of financial 
statements  
 
(Examination of financial 
statements to determine 
whether they give a true and 
fair view.) 
____ Confidentiality 
____ Expertise 
____ Professional 
         reputation 
____ Independence 
____ Objectivity 
____ Integrity 
____ Costliness 
O  Accountant 
O  Attorney/Lawyer 
O  Engineering Consultant 
O  ICT Consultant 
O  Management Consultant 
O  NGO 
O  Your Own Organization 
O  Other ____________ 
2) Examination of 
nonfinancial 
environmental measures 
 
 (Verification that 
environmental performance 
measures are reliable.) 
____ Confidentiality 
____ Expertise 
____ Professional 
         reputation 
____ Independence 
____ Objectivity 
____ Integrity 
____ Costliness 
O  Accountant 
O  Attorney/Lawyer 
O  Engineering Consultant 
O  ICT Consultant 
O  Management Consultant 
O  NGO 
O  Your Own Organization 
O  Other ____________ 
3) ISO certification 
 
(Assurance of the adoption 
and implementation of ISO 
standards by a given 
organisation.) 
____ Confidentiality 
____ Expertise 
____ Professional 
         reputation 
____ Independence 
____ Objectivity 
____ Integrity 
____ Costliness 
O  Accountant 
O  Attorney/Lawyer 
O  Engineering Consultant 
O  ICT Consultant 
O  Management Consultant 
O  NGO 
O  Your Own Organization 
O  Other ____________ 
4) System reliability 
 
(Assurance that an entity’s 
internal systems provide 
reliable information for 
operating and financial 
decisions.) 
____ Confidentiality 
____ Expertise 
____ Professional 
         reputation 
____ Independence 
____ Objectivity 
____ Integrity 
____ Costliness 
O  Accountant 
O  Attorney/Lawyer 
O  Engineering Consultant 
O  ICT Consultant 
O  Management Consultant 
O  NGO 
O  Your Own Organization 
O  Other ____________ 
5) Compliance with 
laws and regulations 
 
(Verification of the extent an 
organization complies with 
particular laws and 
regulations that are in force.) 
____ Confidentiality 
____ Expertise 
____ Professional 
         reputation 
____ Independence 
____ Objectivity 
____ Integrity 
____ Costliness 
O  Accountant 
O  Attorney/Lawyer 
O  Engineering Consultant 
O  ICT Consultant 
O  Management Consultant 
O  NGO 
O  Your Own Organization 
O  Other ____________ 
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6) Integrity and ethics 
audits 
 
(Assessment and evaluation of 
the ethical principles, 
guidelines and actions of the 
entity.) 
 
____ Confidentiality 
____ Expertise 
____ Professional 
         reputation 
____ Independence 
____ Objectivity 
____ Integrity 
____ Costliness 
O  Accountant 
O  Attorney/Lawyer 
O  Engineering Consultant 
O  ICT Consultant 
O  Management Consultant 
O  NGO 
O  Your Own Organization 
O  Other ____________ 
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NOTES 
 
1 For example, see the report of the AICPA’s Special Committee on Financial Reporting (1994), the 
so-call Jenkins report. 
2 For example, see Sundem, Dukes and Elliott (1996). 
3 With the tightening of rules concerning the types of services that auditors can offer to their audit 
clients, the market for non-audit assurance services has become more restricted.  However, the 
services considered in this study are generally not considered to be consulting in nature, the primary 
area of new restrictions.  Furthermore, there are no limitations on an accountant’s ability to offer 
assurance services to non-audit clients. 
4 For FEE initiatives and environmental and social reporting and assurance in Europe see special issue 
of European Accounting Review (2000).   
5 Research has been conducted to examine aspects of users’ perceptions of the new services (Fargher 
and Gramling, 1996 (investment performance assurance); Fargher, Gorman and Wilkins, 1998 (book-
to-bill disclosures); Havelka, Sutton and Arnold, 1998 (information systems assurance); Houston and 
Taylor, 1999 (WebTrust); Hunton, Benford, Arnold and Sutton 2000 (WebTrust); Srivastava and 
Mock, 2000 (WebTrust)).  In addition there are numerous professional publications providing 
descriptive evidence of the variety of assurance services being offered in practice.    
6 Note: Since our purpose was to test the impact provider attributes have on specific decisions by 
consumers of assurance services, we felt it was important to include a broader list of attributes than 
just those that are most frequently selected from a long list.  Furthermore, our pilot testing did not 
depend on formal factor analysis because we were also concerned with how respondents to our survey 
would interpret and react to the identified attributes.  There is some overlap of our final list of 
attributes with those identified by Carcello, Hermanson and McGrath (1992) and Warming-
Rasmussen and Jensen (1998).  Expertise appears in all three lists, independence and objectivity 
appears in the Warming-Rasmussen and Jensen list and, arguably, professional reputation has parallels 
in both lists.  More unique to our study is the inclusion of confidentiality, integrity and costliness in 
the final set of attributes to be tested.   
7 Pilot testing was also used to arrive at the list of alternative service providers.  We originally started 
with a list of 25 providers that were reduced to the current list of 7.  Examples of professions 
eliminated through pilot testing include government agencies, bankers/financiers, academics, labor 
groups and directors. 
8 Examination of Cook’s and Mahalanobis distances further confirm this conclusion. 
9 In the USA, these services would be similar to WebTrust and SysTrust as developed by the US and 
Canadian professional institutes. 
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TABLE 1 
Expansion of Assurance Opportunities by Independent Accountants 
 
  Customer Base 
  Existing Expanded 
Needs Served (I) 
 
Financial audit 
Review 
Agreed-upon procedures 
Compilations 
 
(III) 
 
ISO 9000 certification 
Internet controls 
 Not 
Served 
(II) 
 
Performance indicators 
Risk assessment 
IT quality 
(IV) 
 
E-commerce 
System reliability 
Health care effectiveness 
 
Source: Adapted from the AICPA Special Committee Report on Assurance Services (1996).  
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TABLE 2 
Risk Management and the Independent Accountant 
 
Component of Risk 
Management 
Traditional Roles of 
Independent Accountants 
Potential Future Roles of 
Independent Accountants 
Identification of risk • Assess risks that financial 
assertions are misstated. 
• Assess completeness of 
business risks identified by 
management. 
• Assess reasonableness of the 
prioritization of risk by 
management. 
Response to risk • Assess quality of controls 
related to accuracy of 
financial reporting. 
• Assess quality of actions 
taken by management in 
response to specific risks. 
• Assess cost effectiveness of 
responses to risks. 
Information system for 
monitoring risk 
• Assess reliability of the 
accounting information 
system for financial 
reporting. 
• Assess quality and 
appropriateness of 
performance measures used 
to measure risk. 
• Assess reliability of 
information systems used to 
generate performance 
measures. 
• Evaluate appropriateness of 
technology underlying 
information systems. 
Performance 
measurement reporting 
• Verify accuracy of financial 
statements and disclosures 
• Verify accuracy of 
performance measures. 
• Evaluate appropriateness 
and timeliness of 
information distribution. 
Reaction to risk  • Assess quality  of 
management’s utilization of 
risk information. 
• Evaluate timeliness and 
appropriateness of 
management’s response to 
changing risk conditions. 
Source: Adapted from Knechel (2001). 
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TABLE 3 
 
Assurance Services Included in Survey 
 
 Category of Service 
 
Established Service Emerging Service 
 Quality of data  
Audit of financial 
statements 
 
 
Examination of nonfinancial 
environmental measures 
 Effectiveness of processes  
ISO certification 
 
 
System reliability 
 Compliance  
Legal compliance 
 
 
Ethical compliance 
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TABLE 6  
Results from Regression Analysis 
 
 
Model:   PRACCT a = b0 + b1* LNSIZE + b2*BIG5 + b3* ASISOCERT + b4* ASSYSTEM       
+ b5* ASCOMPLI + b6* ASETHICS +  b7* CONFID + b8* EXPERT  
                                     + b9* REPUT + b10* INDEP +  b11* OBJECT + b12* INTEG + b13*COST 
      
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients  
Standardized 
Coefficients    
    B Std. Error   Beta   t-value Sig. b 
 (Constant) 1.874 0.946   1.981 0.049 ** 
 CONFID 0.013 0.049  0.019 0.258 0.797  
 EXPERT 0.016 0.041  0.027 0.384 0.702  
 REPUT 0.204 0.047  0.345 4.387 0.000 *** 
 INDEP -0.127 0.050  -0.191 -2.527 0.012 ** 
 OBJECT 0.088 0.056  0.128 1.564 0.119  
 INTEG 0.107 0.048  0.167 2.217 0.028 ** 
 COST -0.082 0.044  -0.131 -1.854 0.065 * 
 LNSIZE 0.009 0.033  0.018 0.267 0.789  
 BIG 5 0.397 0.585  0.049 0.679 0.498  
 ASISOCERT 0.167 0.254  0.053 0.657 0.512  
 ASSYSTEM  -0.548 0.254  -0.176 -2.157 0.032 ** 
 ASCOMPLI    0.071 0.254  0.023 0.281 0.779  
  ASETHICS    0.143 0.254   0.046 0.563 0.574  
         
 Adj. R-square 13.53%       
 F-Value 3.5162       
 Model sig. 0.0001 **      
 
a Dependent Variable: PRACCT = likelihood of selecting an independent accountant using a 5-point Likert 
scale.  
 
b *, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 
levels or better, respectively. 
 
